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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000819-CA 
v. : 
DANIEL HERRERA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, enhanced 
to a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (d) & (4)(a)-
(b) (1998 & Supp. 2000), and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Is the evidence sufficient to support defendant's jury convictions for 
possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia found strewn on the floor in the 
backseat area of the Honda where defendant was the sole backseat occupant and 
also made furtive movements? 
No standard of review applies to this unpreserved issue. "[A]s a general rule, a 
defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to 
preserve the issue for appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 16. Here, defendant 
failed to raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection; moreover, he 
fails to argue any plain or obvious deficiency in the evidence that would warrant appellate 
review. Id. at^ flj 14-17. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, and'or rules are 
contained in the addendum: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (d) & (4)(a)-(b) (1998 & Supp. 2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, an enhanced first 
degree felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (Rl-2). 
Following a jury trial held on 19 July 2000, defendant was convicted as charged (R182). 
The trial court imposed consecutive statutory sentences of five-years-to-life for the first 
degree felony and six-months for the misdemeanor (R246-248). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R236). Thereafter, the supreme court 
transferred the appeal to this Court (R371). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Brigham City Police received a tip that defendant, for whom there was a state-wide 
warrant, would be in Brigham City on 24 March 2000, to buy a cell phone at a local 
residence (R373:114, 157). Detectives Ortiz, Howard, and Vincent parked an unmarked 
patrol car at a gas station near the targeted Brigham City residence (R373:79-80, 102-103, 
166). Defendant arrived in a green Honda with two other individuals (R373:80, 103, 
166). Defendant was the sole occupant of the backseat area, codefendant Greer was 
driving, and codefendant Willard occupied the front passenger seat (R373:91,105, 167). 
All three exited the Honda and entered residence (R373:82, 103, 166). Greer and Willard 
remained inside for approximately five to ten minutes before leaving the residence and 
driving off in the Honda (R373:82, 104, 166). Five to ten minutes later, Greer and 
Willard returned and again entered the residence (R373:82-83, 104, 166). Five to ten 
minutes later, defendant exited the residence with both Greer and Willard and all re-
entered the Honda (R373:83, 104, 166-167). Greer again drove, with Willard in the front 
passenger seat and defendant again the sole occupant in the back seat (R373:83-84, 105, 
167). 
The detectives stopped the Honda a few blocks from the residence (R373:84). The 
detectives exited their unmarked car with guns drawn and repeatedly yelled, "Police, put 
!The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 2, 10 P.3d 346. 
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your hands up, show me your hands" (R373:85-88, 108, 118, 168-169). Codefendants 
Greer and Willard complied with the detectives' requests to show their hands (R373:86-
87, 108, 125, 126, 169, 174). Defendant did not comply, but rather, immediately "ducked 
down out of sight" and reached his hands under the front driver's seat as if to hide or grab 
something (R373:87, 105-106, 120-125, 168, 189-191, 195). Defendant's furtive conduct 
concerned the detectives, who thought that he was reaching for a weapon (R373:87, 106, 
120-121, 190). While Detective Vincent removed Greer from the driver's side of the 
Honda, Detective Howard opened the front passenger door and pulled Willard out 
(R373:89, 125, 190). With Detective Ortiz covering Willard, Detective Howard reached 
into the backseat and pulled defendant out (R373:88-89, 125, 190). Because of 
defendant's non-compliance, Detective Howard was not able to see defendant's hands 
until he pulled him from the Honda (R373:88, 109). 
While no drug-related items or weapons were ultimately found on defendant's 
person, a search of the backseat area he alone occupied revealed a small black box, 
spilled open on the passenger side floor (R373:90-92, 191). The black box converted into 
a small scale and contained loose methamphetamine, a syringe with meth residue, a Q-tip, 
and a baggie (R373:90-92). Additionally, underneath the driver's seat, where defendant 
had been reaching, Detective Howard found a Camel cigarette box with a small baggie 
attached to it and another baggie inside the cigarette box, both containing 
methamphetamine (R373:93-98, 109, 192). 
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Searches of codefendants Greer and Willard turned up two plastic baggies 
containing meth, a ziplock baggie with marijuana, a scale and a knife all on Willard's 
person, and several items containing marijuana residue were found inside Greer's purse 
(R373:126-129, 154-155). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should not consider defendant's insufficiency claim because he failed to 
preserve the claim below and because he fails to argue plain error or other exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. Even assuming the Court were to overlook these twin failures 
and consider defendant's insufficiency claim, he cannot prevail under the plain error 
standard. There is some evidence that defendant exercised dominion and control over the 
meth and paraphernalia retrieved from the backseat area of the Honda he alone occupied. 
Consequently, defendant cannot show an obvious absence of supporting evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE AND 
PARAPHERNALIA STREWN ON THE FLOOR IN THE 
BACKSEAT AREA OF THE HONDA WHERE HE WAS THE SOLE 
BACKSEAT OCCUPANT AND WAS ALSO OBSERVED 
FURTIVELY DUCKING TO THE FLOOR AND REACHING 
UNDER THE DRIVER'S SEAT 
Defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdicts here 
because "[t]he State failed to show a nexus between [defendant] and the drugs and 
paraphernalia sufficient enough to infer that [defendant] had both the ability and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the drugs and paraphernalia." Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support enhancement of 
the meth offense to a first degree felony. Aplt. Br. at 7-13. Defendant's insufficiency 
claim is unpreserved, inadequately briefed, and otherwise lacks merit. 
A. This Court Should Not Consider Defendant's Insufficiency 
Claim Because He Failed to Preserve it Below and Further 
Fails to Argue Plain Error or Exceptional Circumstances 
on Appeal. 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule 
"applies to every claim, including [sufficiency claims], unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at ffi[ 11, 
14. 
In this case, defendant did not raise his insufficient evidence claim below. 
Furthermore, he does not argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. 
See Aplt. Br. at 7-13. Consequently, this Court should not reach his claim. See State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (rejecting defendant's claim that State was 
required to establish certain mens rea at preliminary hearing where defendant did not raise 
the claim below: "Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 
'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal."). 
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B. This Court Should Not Reach Defendant's Insufficiency 
Claim Because He Fails to Demonstrate an Obvious 
Absence of Supporting Evidence. 
Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's twin failures to either preserve his 
insufficiency claim below, or to argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, 
he cannot prevail. This is because the jury verdict is supported by at least some evidence 
which is all that the Holgate plain error standard requires. 
Holgate Plain Error Standard. The Holgate plain error standard requires the 
reviewing court to view "the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and then to determine whether it 'is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.'" Id. at f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1992)). If 
the evidence is determined to be insufficient, the reviewing court must still determine 
"whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to 
submit the case to the jury." Id. In sum, "to establish plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial 
court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at ^J17. An example of such an 
obvious evidentiary defect "is the case in which the State presents no evidence to support 
an essential element of a criminal charge." Id. 
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Constructive Possession Standard. Actual physical possession is not necessary 
to convict for possession of drugs and paraphernalia. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 
(Utah 1985). A conviction may be based upon constructive possession of drugs and 
paraphernalia so long as they are found "in a place or under circumstances indicating that 
the defendants have the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 1311-132 (Utah 1987). That is, there must be a "sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the 
power and intent to exercise dominion and control." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. This nexus 
may be established through circumstantial evidence, State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 
(Utah 1981), including the proximity of a defendant to the drugs, and whether the drugs 
are in plain view. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1991). 
This Case. Here, defendant complains that he did not own the Honda and was 
merely present in the backseat area where the meth and paraphernalia were found. Aplt. 
Br. at 8. Defendant broadly contends the evidence is therefore insufficient to 
demonstrate that he exercised constructive dominion and control over the meth and 
paraphernalia. Id. Defendant overlooks other evidence that the detectives observed him 
make furtive movements as if to hide something on the floor in the backseat area 
(R373:87, 105-106, 120-125, 168, 189-191, 195). Further, immediately following 
defendant's arrest, Detective Howard retrieved the spilled contents of the black 
box/scale, and the cigarette box filled with meth, from the areas where defendant was 
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furtively ducking and reaching only moments earlier (R373:90-98, 109, 191-192). 
Because defendant was the sole backseat occupant, and because the other suspects made 
no furtive movements, the eminently reasonable inference is that defendant exercised 
dominion and control over the meth and paraphernalia discovered strewn on the floor in 
the backseat area of the Honda. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 14-17. 
Defendant's Authority Distinguished. Defendant places primary reliance on 
State v. Layman, 985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999). While Layman concerns sufficiency of the 
evidence in a constructive possession case, the sufficiency question in Layman did not 
arise in a plain error context like this case, nor is it a "car case." Id. at 914. Rather, in 
Layman, the supreme court found that the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that Layman exercised dominion and control over another person such that 
Layman possessed the drugs found on the other person. Id. That is a different question 
entirely than whether defendant possessed meth and paraphernalia strewn on the floor in 
the backseat area of the Honda he alone occupied, particularly where he made 
movements as if to hide or grab something in the area. See Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 
(recognizing that presence plus incriminating behavior and proximity to drugs in plain 
view is enough to establish constructive possession). 
While defendant also favorably cites Salas, that case actually supports the State's 
theory of constructive possession. This Court reversed the driver Salas's conviction for 
possession, finding that the furtive movements of a backseat passenger immediately prior 
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to the traffic stop and the recovery of cocaine from a crevice inaccessible to Salas as the 
driver, rendered the evidence insufficient to establish that Salas knew about the cocaine. 
Id. at 1388-1389. The evidence suggested, as it does in this case, that the cocaine 
belonged instead to the backseat passenger. Id. 
In sum, there is some evidence supporting the elements of the constructive 
possession convictions at issue here - - defendant was the sole occupant of the backseat 
area where the meth and paraphernalia were strewn, and he alone made furtive 
movements in this area. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ff 17-18. Consequently, defendant 
cannot show that there is an obvious absence of supporting evidence and he therefore 
fails to demonstrate that the trial court plainly erred in submitting this case to the jury, 
rather than sua sponte discharging him.2 Id. 
2For the same reasons defendant fails to show the absence of any supporting 
evidence, he arguably fails to marshal the supporting evidence and view it in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. As the appellant, it is the defendant's burden to 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the jury verdict and then to demonstrate that, 
viewed in the most favorable light to the verdict, it is insufficient to support the verdict. 
See State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). While defendant arguably 
attempts to marshal the evidence, as demonstrated above, he recites only the evidence and 
inferences favorable to his insufficiency theory. Aplt. Br. at 7-13. This is another ground 
upon which to reject his sufficiency challenge. See Moore, 802 P.2d at 738; State v. 
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury convictions for possession of methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on J _ August 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on l_ August 2001, to the following: 
CANDACE S. BRIDGESS 
Box Elder Public Defender 
795 East 24th Street 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of 
any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five 
or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or 
any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule EQ or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree 
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact 
finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group All Rights Reserved 
may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless 
it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied 
by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree 
felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the 
plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any 
public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a 
person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this 
Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of 
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group All Rights Reserved 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license 
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of 
obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, 
to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to 
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from 
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to 
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of 
this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or 
device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling 
so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, 
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the 
act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of 
any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All Rights Reserved. 
at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution 
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age., regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be 
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been 
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than 
a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is 
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of 
the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
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58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter Any person 
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture 
with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used 
to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person under 18 
years of age who is three years or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of a 
third degree felony 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, 
or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to 
promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
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